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The US sponsored peace talks in Dayton in autumn 1995 gathered
representatives of the three constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the neighboring states, and an internationally composed five member Contact group-
each of them trying to end a war, but also to promote some other specific interests
and in that way influencing the outcome of negotiations. When estimating the Dayton
Agreement ten years after, it seems that more international pressure should have been
exerted on regional participants of the peace talks to accept a more viable
constitutional framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina, with more competencies
vested centrally and locally than in the entities. From the outset, more authority in
implementation should have been granted to the High Representative, whose powers
should have been transferred to the local population gradually, with clear dynamics
and set benchmarks.
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1. Introduction
Almost all key Dayton players are, for one rea-
son or another, out of political life. Five regional repre-
sentatives initialed (or had to initial) the Dayton agree-
ment: three of them as presidents of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muslim led, but internation-
ally recognized), the Republic of Croatia, and the Re-
public of Serbia (representing also the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, Montenegro, and all Serbs out of Ser-
bia), while the other two of them were representing the
two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Republic
of Srpska and Federation). All three mentioned presi-
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dents: President Tudrnan of Croatia, President
Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, President
Milosevic of Serbia are dead (President Milosevic died
in the custody of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia - ICTY - during the trial against
him). Representatives of entities (at the same time rep-
resenting Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats) Morncilo
Krajisnik (the President of the Assembly of the Repub-
lic of Srpska, representing Bosnian Serbs, who refused
to initial the agreement in Dayton, so President Milosevic
had to do it instead of him) and Jadranko Prlic (the Min-
ister of Defense and the Deputy Prime Minister of the
Federation, representing Bosnian Croats, who initialed
the agreement instead of Kresimir Zubak, President of
the Federation), were also indicted by the ICTY.
The same or similar destiny affected most of re-
gional chiefs of staff, ministers of defense, and even some
116 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
ministers of foreign affairs. A few of them, who are still
alive and at large, have been - almost without an excep-
tion - politically marginalized. Even Richard Holbrooke,
not a local actor, but the chief American peace negotia-
tor famous for his "bulldozer diplomacy";' has never
become the Secretary of State. the position he expected
and longed for. He has left diplomacy and now works in
the private sector.
Is there a Dayton curse, and if there is, is it justi-
fied? Could and should have we done better in Dayton?
I am not sure about the curse, but ten years after,
I firmly believe that we could and should have done
better ill Dayton. By "we", I do not refer only to the
three constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Croats, Muslims/Bosniacs and Serbs), the Republic of
Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), involved as neighboring states both
in hostilities and the peace talks, but also to the United
States and other states members of the Contact Group
(France, Germany, Russian Federation and United King-
dom ).
Contact group members, apart from interests re-
lated to Bosnia and Herzegovina, also followed their spe-
cific interests, sometimes totally unrelated to the well-
being of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its constituent peo-
ples.' The United States - as organizers of the confer-
ence and the key international player - were influenced
in their decision making by various factors, some of them
related to domestic (such as effects of various scenarios
on forthcoming presidential elections), and some to for-
eign policy. 4 High on their agenda was, for example, the
influence of the Bosnian case on the enlargement of
NATO towards East Europe and the redefinition of its
role.' Through their support of Muslims of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the US also wanted to be perceived as a
reliable protector of pro-western Muslims and their coun-
tries around the world. The US involvement had been
aimed to prevent the influence of radical Muslim COllJl-
tries and radical groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but
also to prevent radicals from gaining popularity in Mus-
lim countries worldwide since they took upon themselves
the role of the defenders of Bosnian Muslims.
Finally, an important message had been sent that
the United States are the only remaining superpower and
that no serious international crisis can be resolved with-
out them. It has been argued that reserved and cold re-
ception of other peace plans preceding the Dayton Agree-
ment on behalf of the US can be attributed to the issue
of international prestige." Some other Contact Group
members involved in Dayton proximity talks were ob-
viously also concerned with their public appearance. The
Russian Federation wanted to show that in spite of its
weakening, it has remained the second world power, and
that its proteges can continue to count on its support.
Althougb there were some common interests of the EU
countries in the face-saving regarding their competence
to successfully resolve problems in tbeir own backyard
and in preventing further refugees from fleeing and set-
tling in the EU countries, some interests of individual
countries were quite different. Some of them, for exam-
ple, wanted to justify their permanent membership in
the Security Council, while the others wanted to show
just the opposite: that their time had come.
In pursuing country specific agendas, Dayton has
for some of them been more. and for some of them less
successful. When I say that we could and should have
done better in Dayton, I refer to the wellbeing of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and its constituent peoples.
There is no doubt that the Dayton agreement has
been instrumental "To end a war". as Richard Holbrooke
entitled his book on Bosnian peace negotiations. 7 After
almost four years of sufferings, this was an undutiful
achievement." But. on the other hand, some other as-
pects of the Dayton Peace Agreement seem far less im-
pressive: today, ten years after Dayton. from an eco-
nomic, political and a security point of view, Bosnia and
Herzegovina is still not a self sustainable state, and it
still depends on a constant international support. Im-
pressive financial resources invested in Bosnia and
Herzegovina have mostly been spent unproductively, on
national and international bureaucracy.
2. What was wrong with Dayton?
Dayton was envisaged to be a pragmatic solu-
tion. When the US finally decided to get involved in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, they remained reluctant to
engage their own troops (especially in combat activities
on tbe ground), so they combined diplomatic efforts with
the support of local military activities related to the
peaceful settlement. After Croatian forces. following a
military success in Croatia, together with Bosnian Croat
and Muslim forces, liberated approximately half of the
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, previous shuttle
diplomacy was succeeded by proximity talks." Repre-
sentatives of the three constituent peoples of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, of Croatia and the FRY were summoned
in Dayton by the United States." Diplomatic offers to
delegations were not based on the perception of justice.
but on the perception of their bargaining power. Sticks
and carrots have been extensively used to pusb all sides
into the agreement. However. it is obvious now that the
arrangement easiest to push through and to be approved
by all sides has not provided for a sustainable model for
Bosnia and Herzegovina."
But it was not only the institutional model for
Bosnia and Herzegovina that was wrong. Its implemen-
tation, especially during the first years after its adop-
tion, lacked both enthusiasm and support of the local
population, and commitment and adequate authority on
behalf of the international community and its representa-
tives.
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Let us first examine the model. The basic prob-
lem with the model was that it was based on war time
realities instead of forward looking. It was also too com-
plicated, bureaucratic and inefficient. Finally, it was
imposed on the three constituent peoples and it lacked
local support and legitimacy."
Creating two highly independent entities for the
three constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
a bad starting point. In fact, many of the problems with
the elaboration of the model have their origin in this
initial contradiction.
The Republic of Srpska has been created during
the war. Its territory was controlled by Bosnian Serb
forces. and most of the non-Serb population who had
lived there prior to the war (mostly Muslims and Croats)
were ethnically cleansed. For Bosnian Serbs (supported
by Belgrade) preserving the Republic ofSrpska had been
a precondition for any peace negotiations. During the
shuttle negotiations prior to Dayton, the Republic of
Srpska had already been granted the status of a highly
independent (con) federal unit and 49% of the territory. 13
The other entity, the Federation, was also not a
traditional, but a war construct. The Federation was cre-
ated as an American sponsored war alliance between
mutually mistrustful Bosnian Croats and Muslims." The
tragic conflict between Bosnian Croats and Muslims
during which they were fighting each other over the re-
maining territory (instead of facing the Serbian aggres-
sion side to side) finally stopped. The war alliance was
successful, but on a long run - Croats and Muslims had
different agendas.
Because of the international fear of disintegra-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its negative conse-
quences for the regional peace and security, I.' Bosnian
Croats were not allowed to preserve their separate en-
tity, which was also established during the war under
the name ofHrvatska Republ ika Herceg Bosna (Croatian
Republic of Herzeg Bosnia). The Republic of Croatia
first supported, and then, after international pressure,
contributed to the dismantling of Herceg Bosna. The
interests of Bosnian Muslims (as the largest ethnic
group), both in the Federation and in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, have been best protected by their number
(so they favored "one man, one vote" principle and the
majority rule). Bosnian Serbs protected their interests
through a separate entity under their control, the Re-
public of Srpska, with a quasi state status. Bosnian
Croats, by far the smallest constituent people in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, when they learned that their entity will
not be tolerated. in order to protect their interests and
equality, had to insist on equal representation and con-
sensus decision making of all constituent peoples (both
in the Federation and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Bosnian
Serbs also supported equal representation and consen-
SLiS decision making in all issues falling within the com-
petence of central authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The system that was created under the mentioned
constrains has proved to be complicated, ineffective and
very expensive." III addition to political problems in
reaching a consensus. four levels of administration (be-
low the level of entities there are cantons and communes)
also impose a heavy bureaucratic burden. Altogether, in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, its entities and cantons. there
are 14 constitutions. 14 governments and 180 ministers.
Such a high level of decentralization without an effi-
cient system of democratic control facilitates patronage
and corruption. The system is also very expensive: for
example, as the High Representative Ashdown pointed
out, as much as 70'% of the taxes in the Federation go
for salaries of politicians.
Billions of dollars offoreign aid poured in Bosnia
and Herzegovina have not brought on any significant
economic revival of the country." In fact, most of the
money has been spent on national and international bu-
reaucracies. and on buying only short-term stability."
2.2. Implementation
The model designed for Bosnia and Herzegovina
in Dayton obviously had many shortcomings. but its in-
adequate implementation also significantly contributed
to the overall bad results. The Dayton Agreement at last
brought a lasting peace and has given some time to build
on it, and to improve the constitutional framework in
order to make the state more viable. However, this did
not take place for two main reasons: the local popula-
tion, strongly divided along the ethnic lines, could not
agree on tbe necessary improvements of the system,
while the international administration lacked clear com-
mitment and long-term planning of its activities.
Although the leadership of all three ethnic groups
in Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted the Dayton Peace
Agreement, they did it under pressure. They disliked at
least some aspects of the agreement they had to accept.
and therefore blocked their implementation whenever
they could. It should not come as a surprise that an eth-
nically divided local population could not agree on a
further development of the institutional framework for
Bosnia and Herzegovina: after all, until recently they
were fighting each other. Ending the conflict without
winners and losers might have facilitated the acceptance
of the Dayton Peace Agreement, but it also prolonged
the existence of mutually incompatible views that have
led to the conflict itself.'? Proponents of mutually in-
compatible views have been systematically blocking each
other in any attempt to seriously change the system. Prin-
ciples of equal representation and consensus decision
making successfully prevented interest domination of
one ethnic group over the other, but also blocked every
attempt to change the system and make it more efficient.
The international community and their representa-
tives involved in the implementation of the Dayton
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3. What to do?Agreement also share their part of the responsibility. The
international actors involved, afraid of the reaction and
public opinion in their own countries, never set up a
realistic framework for peace-building and state-build-
ing activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Although it
has been obvious from the outset that these activities
require a long-term presence, they have been presented
as a relatively short time limited operation. This hypoc-
risy negatively reflected on rational planning of activi-
ties, and timing of the transfer of powers from interna-
tional administration to the local one."
The international administration in Bosnia and
Herzegovina was not explicit that it would stay until their
job was done and until Bosnia and Herzegovina became
a sustainable state. Lack of such a clear commitment
encouraged those who opposed the implementation of
Dayton and the sustainability of Bosnia and
Herzegovina." Furthermore, the hesitation of interna-
tional troops to apprehend indicted war criminals, espe-
cially Karadzic and Mladic, left the impression that for-
eigners would be withdrawing soon, and that old war-
lords could regain their power.
A weak start of the international administration,
decentralized and not sufficiently coordinated implemen-
tation activity of multiple international organizations and
their representatives as well as local opposition to the
implementation ofthe Dayton Agreement, caused a para-
dox: over time powers of the High Representative was
increasing, while the powers of the local population was
decreasing. At first, international administration was
shying away from concentrating power in their hands: it
would have implied too much responsibility and it did
not seem conducive to the early exit strategy. The situa-
tion demanded a completely different approach: local
opposition to the implementation of the Dayton Agree-
ment and an inefficient model of decision making were
threatening to create such a mess in Bosnia and
Herzegovina that finally powers of the High Representa-
tive had to be significantly increased. So, instead of con-
centrating sufficient power to lead the process of imple-
mentation in the right direction, and then gradually trans-
ferring the power to the local population, the process in
BiH was just the opposite. Such an inverse process of
the transfer of power was certainly not the best way to
progress towards sustainability of the country and its
self government. The initial lack of credibility of the
High Representative and its administration required af-
terwards a much higher concentration of power in order
to restore authority, than it would have initially been
necessary. In exercising their enlightened absolutism, the
High Representatives even fired democratically elected
officials and prohibited political parties when they esti-
mated that their activity was harmful for the implemen-
tation ofthe Dayton agreement." In many respects, such
a behavior was counterproductive and strengthened na-
tionalistic sentiments instead of weakening them.
The constitutional framework designed in Dayton
as Annex 4 to the Framework Agreement has worn out
its benefits (ending of the war, providing at least formal
acceptance of the Agreement by all sides). Its shortcom-
ings are clearly visible (especially the expensive and
ineffective decision-making). It is hard to imagine Bosnia
and Herzegovina as a sustainable state with such an in-
stitutional framework. The international exit strategy is
already being implemented, but it is not clear whether
the local population is ready for the full transfer of power,
and capable to successfully take over full administra-
tion of their own country. The negotiations on the
Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU
have started, but there are frank and friendly warnings
coming from the EU Commission, that if a more effi-
cient state model is not adopted in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, they might last forever.
This might be a watershed for Bosnia and
Herzegovina. If the EU carrots are attractive enough, per-
haps a consensus on a more efficient model will emerge.
Unfortunately, the EU has reduced the number of immi-
nent carrots: pre-accession funds are now much thinner
for the newcomers than they used to be. However, the
importance of a clear European perspective for Bosnia
and Herzegovina is great. Accession to the EU along with
the neighboring states (of course, not simultaneously, but
when conditions are fulfilled in each of them), represents
the best answer to the key problems of this country. Bor-
ders between the same ethnic groups living in different
states after dissolution of the former Yugoslavia would
become softer, facilitating cooperation without threaten-
ing the integrity of the country, Minority ethnic groups,
no matter the country, entity or canton they live in, would
be guaranteed a high level of protection of their rights.
Finally, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the scope of common
regulations and policies for all EU countries would re-
duce the extent of questions that have to be agreed upon
within the country and help to avoid unnecessary con-
frontations. A stable institutional framework would also
create a more favorable investment climate.
The recent proposal ofthe Bosnian Catholic Bish-
ops' Conference for the new and more efficient model of
state organization (that promotes interests of Bosnian
Croats, but also of Bosnia and Herzegovina and all of its
citizens), is encouraging. The essence of the proposal is a
transfer of power from entities to central and local levels
and a reduction from four to three levels of state adminis-
tration." The only serious opposition to such a transfor-
mation comes from the Republic ofSrpska. However, this
is enough to block the consensus of all constituent peo-
ples, necessary for any major institutional change.
If EU carrots do not work for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, it is quite likely that sticks will be used.
But, even that would not be the worst. The worst case
scenario is that the international community gives up,
and that its representatives withdraw from Bosnia and
JULY - DECEMBER 2005 119
Herzegovina before it reforms its institutional framework
and becomes sustainable. The consequences, both for
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the broader region, could
be very serious."
Have we learned anything from the Yugoslav
experience? In fact, if we compare the negative factors
that have facilitated the brake-up of former Yugoslavia
with the present situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
there are unpleasantly many similarities." They include:
recession and a high levels of unemployment, a division
line between religions (Islam, Catholic and Orthodox)
going through the country, no single ethnic group con-
stituting the majority of population, war inflicted trau-
mas, a low level of economic integration, a highly ex-
pensive, slow and inefficient constitutional model based
on equal representation of constituent peoples, consen-
sus decision-making in central state organs, and a low
level of identification of the majority of population with
their country and of support to its institutions."
What Yugoslavia missed, and what keeps Bosnia
and Herzegovina together, is a strong international pres-
1 This article is based on a presentation delivered by the author
at the international conference Dayton - ten years after. Conflict
resolution and co-operation perspectives, Sarajevo, 29.11. -
1.12.2005.
2 Holbrooke's "bulldozer diplomacy" has definitely been more
efficient than the attempts of his peace negotiating predeces-
sors. Of course, he had United States behind him, but his per-
sonal negotiating style and strategy also made a difference. On
comparison between Richard Holbrooke and David Owen and
their negotiating styles, see Van Es, 2002. On his use of simpli-
fication strategies to facilitate negotiations, see Watkins, 2003.
Excluding other members of Contact group (who were repre-
sented by the US) and Bosnian Serbs and Croats (who were
represented by Croatia and Serbia) from direct negotiations,
made negotiations more manageable, but possibly also made
implementation of the negotiations more difficult (see Cousens
and Cater, 2001).
3 See Simonovic, 13.
4 For interesting report on the background of the US Bosnian
policy, see V.M. Daalder, 2000.
S For Bosnia and Herzegovina non-related interests in Dayton,
see Simonovic, 1996.
6 See Wiberg, 2005, 17. Out of numerous international peace
plans prior to Dayton, about half of them were rejected by Bosnian
Serbs, and half by Muslims (Croats were the only to - sooner or
later - accept all peace plans). It may be true that Muslims re-
jected some peace plans after receiving signals from the US
that they deserved, and could get more in the future than of-
fered by the plan.
7 See Holbrooke, 1998. It is interesting that at least some major
Dayton players - such as President Tudman - despite some
contained criticism against him and the Republic of Croatia -
regarded Holbrooke's book (with only three minor objections,
which he conferred to Holbrooke through me), as fully accurate
and insightful.
8 Although data vary significantly (UNHCR, International Crisis
Group and Bosnian official sources), it is likely that in Bosnia
and Herzegovina there were over two million refugees and inter-
ence and support. I firmly believe that they should re-
main until Bosnia and Herzegovina develops a rational
ancl efficient state model and becomes integrated into
the EU (together with the rest of the region, and espe-
cially the neighboring states). Phasing out should be
clearly linked to the progress in these activities. Let us
not repeat the same mistake that have been made in
the implementation of the Dayton Agreement: let us
be clear about the long-term goals and perspectives and
let us rationally plan ahead. A de facto international
protectorate, with governmental powers
undemocratically concentrated in the High Representa-
tives as an unelected international official, is obviously
annoying to the majority of population in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. But before the transfer of power, this
system must have a sustainable local alternative. Al-
though at first sight it does not seem that way, it is the
fastest and safest way to the democratic and prosper-
ous Bosnia and Herzegovina.
•
NOTES
nally displaced persons, and over one hundred thousand dead.
9 On the role of Croatian military successes and military coop-
eration with Bosnian Croats and Muslims, but the United States
as well, see Raquz, 2005. Raguz points out that without suc-
cesses of the Croatian Army, Dayton Agreement would not have
been possible.
10 Other Contact group members were also present in Dayton
during the peace talks on the level of political directors of the
ministries of foreign affairs, but their role was more or less mar-
ginal, causing great frustrations.
11 It is possible that it was not only the easiest, but the only
arrangement three sides could agree upon. If this is the case,
would it not have been better to impose a viable system, to be
replaced by the local, viable, democratic agreement at a later
stage, when conditions would be ready? On problems caused
by manipulating with the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina
instead of proclaiming straight forward protectorate, see
Woodwards, 2001.
12 It is at least disputable whether foreigners are successful
constitution makers. Jeremy Bentham strongly argued that be-
ing a foreigner (and not having specific interests or agenda) rep-
resents an advantage. However, experience indicates that, for
local population, it is usually difficult to identify with a foreign
written constitution (see Feldman, 2005, and Simon Chesterman
2005a). It should have been predicted that the model adopted
under strong international (especially US) pressure, including
many compromises and even contradictory solutions, would be
difficult to implement: all sides were motivated to revise or ob-
struct the settlement to which they have pledged themselves.
Without strong international leadership it simply could not have
worked.
13 See Holbrookee, 1998.
14 See Granic, 2005, 87-101.
15 For majority of international actors, division of Bosnia and
Herzegovina along ethnic lines was not an option for two main
reasons: dispersion of various ethnic groups throughout terri-
tory with significant pockets of various ethnicities, and the fear
of a frustrated and potentially radicalized Muslim state in Eu-
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